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1. Introduction
Williams syndrome (henceforth WS) is a rare neurodevelopmental disorder caused by a hemideletion on chromosome
7q11.23 (Peoples et al., 2000). One of themost striking features of individuals withWS is their distinct social-affective proﬁle,
characterized by high sociability, disinhibition, over-friendliness (Bellugi, Adolphs, Cassady, & Chiles, 1999; Klein-Tasman &
Mervis, 2003) and strong empathy (Klein-Tasman & Mervis, 2003).
The precise etiology ofWShypersociability is still unknown;however, neuroanatomical, genetic/molecular and behavioral/
neuropsychological studies have been providing important clues regarding the neural and geneticmechanisms underlyingWS
social phenotype. Of the different brain areas, the amygdala and prefrontal cortex have emergedmore consistently as the two
main neuroanatomical regions that can be hypothesized to be associated with WS hypersocial phenotype.
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A B S T R A C T
Individuals with Williams syndrome display indiscriminate approach towards strangers.
Neuroimaging studies conducted so far have linked this social proﬁle to structural and/or
functional abnormalities in WS amygdala and prefrontal cortex. In this study, the
neuropsychological hypotheses of amygdala and prefrontal cortex involvement in WS
hypersociability was explored using three behavioral tasks – facial emotional recognition
task, a social approach task and a go no/go task. Thus, a group 15 individuals withWilliams
syndrome was compared to two groups of normal developing individuals – a group of 15
individuals matched for chronological age (CA) and 15 individuals matched for mental age
(MA), and sex. Individuals with WS present a speciﬁc impairment in recognizing negative
facial expressions and do not display impairments in response inhibition when compared
with typically developing groups. Although these ﬁndings partially support the amygdala
contribution to WS hypersociability, we found that general cognitive functioning
predicted this performance. Additionally, individuals with WS did not differ from both
CA and MA groups in the recognition of angry facial expressions, a ﬁnding suggesting that
they are actually able to identify stimuli associated with social threat. Overall, the results
seem to indicate that this social proﬁle must be understood within a developmental
framework.
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Amygdala, a component of the neural network underlying social cognition, plays an important role in
processing emotional and social-related stimuli (Adolphs, 1999) and is related to monitoring environmental events
such as danger (Amaral, 2002). These ﬁndings have led some researchers to propose that an abnormal amygdala
processing may be responsible for the hypersocial behavior typical of WS phenotype (e.g., Galaburda & Bellugi, 2000;
Reiss et al., 2004). However, structural magnetic resonance neuroimaging has produced inconsistent results
regarding volume or gray matter density of amygdala in WS (Chiang et al., 2007; Jernigan, Bellugi, Sowell, Doherty,
& Hesselink, 1993; Martens, Wilson, Dudgeon, & Reutens, 2009; Reiss et al., 2004). Functional studies found that people
with Williams syndrome showed greater amygdala activation in response to threatening scenes than to threatening
faces (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005). Taking into account that amygdala plays a key role in monitoring danger; these
authors proposed that its reduced activation in individuals with WS in response to threatening faces might contribute to
their reduced fear of strangers and consequent social disinhibition. Moreover, recent fMRI studies also found an
abnormal activation of the amygdala during face processing (Haas et al., 2009; Paul et al., 2009), providing
additional evidence indicating that failure to recruit this area during face processing may underlie WS high sociability.
Indeed, this hypothesis of an amygdala involvement in WS hypersociability is also congruent with data showing
that individuals with lesions in this area are abnormally friendly towards others (Adolphs, 1999), suggesting
impairment in evaluating the potential threat of objects or organisms in the environment prior to approaching them.
Also, these individuals fail to recognize emotions such as fear, anger, disgust and sadness (Adolphs, 1999) and present a
positive bias when evaluating trustworthiness and approachability of faces in natural poses (Adolphs, Tranel, &
Damasio, 1998).
Together with abnormal patterns of amygdala activation during face processing, evidence of an abnormal connection
between the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex (in particular the orbitofrontal cortex), suggests also a prefrontal
involvement in the WS social phenotype (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005). Thus, an abnormal reactivity of prefrontal
areas has been implicated in WS social knowledge. For instance, in the study of Meyer-Lindenberg and colleagues
(2005), WS individuals (as opposed to controls) showed a task-invariant pattern: orbitofrontal (OFC) cortex was not
differentially activated, and both medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) were
equally responsive during face and scene matching. However, the demanding nature of those tasks was not similar (face
matching task was more difﬁcult than the non-social scene matching task). To overcome this limitation, Mun˜oz et al.
(2009) used the same group of participants but using a more cognitively exigent task (Mun˜oz et al., 2009). Again, results
were consistent with the previous ﬁndings; speciﬁcally, they evidenced increased amygdala reactivity to non-social
relevant aversive stimuli in individuals with WS, regardless of cognitive load; and no prefrontal activation differences
between conditions (contrasting with a greater prefrontal reactivity speciﬁcally in left DLPFC, left OFC and MPFC in the
control group as a function of task difﬁculty). The results provide further evidence of disruption in amygdala-prefrontal
circuitry in individuals with WS (Mun˜oz et al., 2009). Additionally, Mobbs et al. (2007) proposed that an abnormal
frontostriatal circuit, in conjunction with abnormal connectivity between the amygdala and OFC, might be associated
with the hypersocial proﬁle characteristic of individuals with WS. The hypothesis of a prefrontal impairment being
associated with the hypersociability found in WS has also been proposed by a set of behavioral studies (Porter,
Coltheart, & Langdon, 2007; Rhodes, Riby, Park, Fraser, & Campbell, 2009) and is also congruent with speciﬁc structural
brain patterns found in WS in terms of volumetric difference in the frontal lobes speciﬁcally, volumetric changes (Ewart
et al., 1993; Gothelf et al., 2008; Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2004; Reiss et al., 2004) and abnormal patterns of gyriﬁcation
(Gaser et al., 2006; Schmitt et al., 2002).
Taken together, these characteristics suggest that abnormalities in amygdala and prefrontal cortex regulation may
contribute to WS hypersocial proﬁle. Whereas amygdala dysfunction is possibly related to an incapacity to recognize
threat in the environment and thus to properly determine the trustworthiness and approachability of unfamiliar
individuals (consistent with a positive bias in evaluating trustworthiness and approachability of faces in natural and
emotional poses (Jones et al., 2000; Martens et al., 2009)), proposal of prefrontal cortex abnormalities is based upon
clinical similarity with patients with prefrontal lesions (e.g., disinhibition in several circumstances, including social
contacts, and displaying rigid and inﬂexible behaviors) (Semel & Rosner, 2003) and the fact that, despite the non-
rewarding nature of their social relationships (e.g., problems in making and sustaining relationships and are often
rejected by their peers), individuals with WS are continuously attracted to social stimuli, thus revealing some
insensitivity to punishing and negative experiences.
Thus, the objective of the present study is to test amygdala and prefrontal cortex involvement in WS hypersociability
with a neuropsychological approach, using three different behavioral tasks: an emotional recognition task; a social
approach task; a judgment and response inhibition task. The two following hypotheses were tested:
(a) The amygdala hypothesis – if people with WS display manifestations of amygdala dysfunction similar to those with
acquired damage to this structure, they should display impairment in recognizing negative emotions (speciﬁcally,
anger, fearful and sadness). Also, they should judge photos of unfamiliar individuals as highly approachable, not
rating happy expressions as more approachable than negative ones (especially those displaying in anger).
(b) The prefrontal hypothesis – if the abnormal social approach in WS is consistent with patterns of acquired frontal
lobe impairment, individuals with WS should display impaired response inhibition on go/no-go tasks (Liddle, Kiehl,
& Smith, 2001).
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2. Method
2.1. Participants
Study participants included 15 individuals withWilliams syndrome (8 males and 7 females) (mean SD age, 15 3.761;
age-range: 9–21 years), 15 typically developing individuals matched for chronological age (CA) and sex (mean SD age,
14.87 3.94; age-range: 8–21 years) and15 typically developing individuals matched for mental age (MA) and sex (mean SD
age, 7.47 2.50; age-range: 4–14 years). The mean Full Scale IQ was 52.6 (10.398) for SW, 109.13 (9.141) for CA group and
107.73 (13.755) for MA group. Persons with WS were recruited at the Genetic Medical Institute (Portugal) and the Genomic
Foundation in Galicia (Spain).WS diagnosesweremade by FISH conﬁrmation of elastin gene deletion (Ewart et al., 1993). Controls
were typically developing individuals without evidence of psychiatric, neurological disorder or cognitive impairment. After a
complete description of the study, each participant (or their parents) gave written informed consent regarding their participation
in the study via consent forms.
Table 1 displays socio-demographical characteristics of the sample. There are no group differences with respect to socio-
economical status – Graffar index [x2 = (2) = .519; p = .775], although differing in education level [x2(2) = 19.614; p< .001],
and in IQ [x2 (2) = 19.734; p< .001]. Finally, WS and CA groups did not differ in chronological age [t(2) = 19.714; p = .914].
2.2. Neurocognitive assessment
To assess general cognitive functioning, participants with 4 and 5 years were administered the Wechsler Preschool and
Primary Scale of Intelligence – Revised (WPPSI-R;Wechsler & Corporation, 2006), participants between 8 and 16 years of age
were administered theWechsler Intelligence Scale for Children – Third Edition (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991) and subjects over
16 years oldwere administered theWechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Third Edition (WAIS-III;Wechsler, 1997). However, it
is important to note that children from the mental age control group between 6 and 7 years were only administered four
subtests from the WISC-III: Block design, Information, Figure completion and Similarities. The Full Scale IQ was computed
using the following formula: 1.6 (sum of the standardized tests) + 36 [for children with 6 years] and 1.6 (sum of the
standardized tests) + 32 [for childrenwith 7 years] (Kaufman, Kaufman, Balgopal, &McLean, 1996).Mental age of individuals
with WS was inferred individually according to Full Scale IQ (Terman, 1916).
2.3. Materials and stimuli
The procedure, materials and stimuli were presented for each task (emotion recognition task, approachability task and
go/no-go tasks). Tasks were administered in this exact order and were performed in Portuguese and Spanish versions,
according to the participants nationality. All tasks were compiled and ran using Superlab 4.0.7.
2.3.1. Facial expression recognition task
2.3.1.1. Stimuli. The facial expression recognition task was designed to evaluate emotion recognition abilities in relation to
different stimuliwithpositive, negativeandneutral valences. This taskconsisted in thepresentationof facesof12 individuals (6
adults, 3 teenagers and 3 children), displaying ﬁve different andmutually exclusive emotions – anger, fear, neutral, happiness
and sadness.
The adult pictures were taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (Lundqvist et al., 1998) whereas the
photographs from children and teenagers were purposely developed with children from two Portuguese schools. None of the
participants had beards, mustaches, earrings, braces or eyeglasses. The photographs were normalized for size and luminance
(when necessary) and the background details of all photographsweremasked out inwhite using the Adobe Photoshop CS3; so,
distracting cues such as hair and clothes were eliminated, enhancing the focus on the facial expression (see Fig. 1).
Table 1
Socio-demographic characteristics of the groups.
WS (N = 15) CA (N = 15) MA (N = 15)
M (SD) Range M (SD) Range M (SD) Range
Age 15 (3.8) 9–21 14.87 (3.9) 8–21 7.47 (2.5) 4–14
Full Scale IQ 52.6 (10.4) 40–74 108.87 (9.2) 92–123 107.73 (13.8) 87–130
WS (N = 15) CA (N = 15) MA (N = 15)
Mdn Range Mdn Range Mdn Range
Level of education 8 2–9 1 0–8 1 (0–8)
So´cio-economical status 3 1–4 3 2–4 3 2–4
Sex
Male 8 53.33% 8 53.33% 8 53.33%
Female 7 46.67% 7 46.67% 7 46.67%
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Allstimuliwerevalidatedwithapopulationof25childrenfromaprimaryschool(mean SDage,9.16 0.37;age-range:9–10
years) to establish that a typicallydeveloping group correctly labeled emotions. The criterionused tovalidate the stimuliwas theone
suggestedbyEkman(Ekman,Friesen,&Press,1976):90%of thephotographshadtobecorrectly identiﬁedbyat least80%of theraters.
2.3.1.2. Procedure. Prior to testing, to acclimatize participants with the task, they were asked to label the examiner’s
facial expressions and to produce on their own face the ﬁve facial expressions: anger, neutral, fear, happiness and
sadness. Then, 10 practice trials were performed to familiarize the participants with the task. These trials consisted of
the presentation of faces of two adult individuals depicting the ﬁve expressions (one man and one woman) that were
not used elsewhere in the experiment. After the practice trial, participants were presented with one block containing a
total of 60 trials. Participants were asked to label which emotion was displayed by the depicted individual. The
experimenter read the ﬁve options that appeared on the computer screen – happy, neutral, scared/fearful, angry and sad
(corresponding to the ﬁve emotions depicted in the photographs) and then asked the participants to choose one of
them. The photographs remained on screen until the experimenter keyed the participant’s answer. There were two
possibilities for the fear emotion – scared and fearful, since these emotions are almost interchangeable and some
children could interpret some expressions as scared and others as fearful. Thus, in order to avoid this kind of ambiguity,
both terms were accepted. Also, the term neutral expression was replaced (when necessary) by ‘‘normal expression’’
(because is not conceptualized by the children as a ‘‘typical’’ emotion). The order of trials was randomized for each
participant.
2.3.2. Approachability task
2.3.2.1. Stimuli. This task was intended to evaluate approachability ratings in relation to facial stimuli displaying different
emotions (happy, neutral, scared/fearful, angry and sad). The approach scale was similar to previously ones (Frigerio et al.,
2006). The photographs used in this task were the same used in the facial expression recognition task; including 60 trials of
12 individuals depicting ﬁve facial expressions. The fact that the background details of the photographs were masked out
was particularly important in this task. Indeed, the effect of confounding variables such as different hairdos, shape of ears,
was controlled to avoid prejudiced judgments, based on factors other than the face depicting the emotion.
2.3.2.2. Procedure. Prior to testing, 10 practice trials were performed to familiarize the participants with the task. These trials
consisted of faces of two adult individuals depicting ﬁve expressions (onemale and one female) that were used in the practice
trials of the ﬁrst task. Participants were asked whether they would like to interact (talk and/or play) with the pictured
individuals. If the participants answeredpositively theywere then asked towhat extent theywished to interact: ‘‘a lot’’ (scoreof
4)or ‘‘a little’’ (scoreof3). If theyrepliednegatively theywere furtherasked toquantify theiransweras ‘‘probablynot’’ (scoreof2)
or ‘‘deﬁnitely not’’ (score of 1). Participantswere told that therewas no right orwrong answer, to avoid a social desirability bias.
2.3.3. Go/no-go tasks
The go-no tasks used in this study were adapted from the standard go/no-go paradigm that has been used for decades to
test behavioral inhibition (Costantini &Hoving, 1973). These tasks consisted of three emotional tasks and one non-emotional
task. The emotional go/no-go tasks were adapted from similar ones used in studies with typically developing populations
(Reynolds & Jeeves, 1978; Schulz et al., 2007). The go/no go tasks had the same structure, timing parameters and response
demands and provided identical measures of behavioral inhibition but to different types of stimuli: emotional and non-
emotional. Additionally, the use of affective stimuli enabled analysis of performance in response to cues of different
emotional valences (e.g., happy, fearful and angry). Thus, these tasks not only provide ameasure of behavioral inhibition, but
also of the emotional modulation of this inhibition (Drevets & Raichle, 1998).
Both tasks requiredparticipants topressas rapidlyaspossible akey(M)whenever theysee the target stimuli (gocues),while
withholding responses to non-target stimuli (no-go cues). Both the emotional and the non-emotional go/no-go tasks consisted
of 100 stimuli, of which 90 (90%) were go cues and 10 (10%) were no-go cues. The high frequency of go cues creates thus a
tendency to respond that is required to be inhibited for no-go cues, thus providing ameasure of the ability to inhibit responses.
In each trial a single face appeared and remained on the center of the screen until the participant keyed an answer or after 3 s.
Trial order was randomized for each individual.
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 1. Examples of photos used in the emotion recognition and approachability tasks.
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2.3.3.1. Stimuli. Three different emotional go/no-go tasks were presented. These tasks differed only in the no-go cues; one of
the tasks had happy faces as the no-go stimuli; other had scared faces and still other had angry ones. Happy expressionswere
selected because they are thought to induce approachable behaviors, whereas fearful and angry expressions signal the
presence of threat (Adolphs, Russell, & Tranel, 1999), thus inducing avoidant behaviors. It is important to note that fearful
faces alert to some threat other than the expresser, hence signalling danger in an indirect way.
The go-cues for all these tasks were neutral faces from adults, children and teenage models (the same 90 neutral
photographs were presented in all tasks – 30 men, 30 women, 8 teenage girls, 7 teenage boys, 7 young girls and 8 young
boys). The happy non-go cues were from 4women, 3men, 1 teenage girl, 1 young girl and 1 young boy. The angry faces were
from 4women, 1 teenage boy, 1 teenage girl and 1 young girl. Finally, the scared photographs were from 3women, 4 men, 1
teenage boy, 1 teenage girl and 1 young boy.
The adult photographs were selected from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces, whereas the children and teenage
photographs were taken speciﬁcally for this study, along with the faces for the ﬁrst task. The faces depicting happiness, fear
and anger were all validated (in the two validations studies mentioned above), while some neutral ones were not (the only
neutral faces validated were those also used in the ﬁrst task). Indeed, as it is easy to distinguish neutral faces from those
displaying positive and negative emotions, and since the number of neutral faces was elevated, we assumed the validity of
the stimuli. The photographswere normalized for size and luminance (when necessary) andweremasked out inwhite, using
the Adobe Photoshop CS3.
The letters A and X of the same size and colour (black) served as the stimuli for non-emotional go and no-go cues,
respectively, and this task consisted in the presentation of 90 letters ‘‘A’’ and 10 letters ‘‘X’’.
2.3.3.2. Procedure. Prior to testing, a practice task was performed to familiarize the participants with this task. This practice
test consisted in the presentation of 20 faces (15 neutral and 5 happy). The tasks were performed in the following sequence:
go/no-go task with scared faces, go/no-go task with happy faces, go/no-go task with letters and go/no-go task with angry
faces. Participantswere instructed to press as rapidly as they could a key of the keyboard (in this case the ‘‘M’’) when they see
the go cues, while withholding responses for the non-go cues. These instructions were better explained or simpliﬁed when
necessary to guarantee that the participants understood it.
2.4. Data analysis
Data were computed using the SPSS software for Windows 16.0 version. A mixed analysis of variance was used to
determine differences in total correct scores (for task 1) and approach ratings (for task 3) between WS group and
individuals matched for chronological (CA) and mental age (MA). Thus, group (three levels: WS subjects, CA and MA
groups) was used as the between-subject factor and Emotion/Approach ratings (ﬁve levels: happy, neutral, sad, angry
and scared) as the within factor. Also, a mixed analysis of covariance was conducted to analyze the effect of Full Scale IQ
(FSIQ) in the emotion recognition task. The criteria of normality (Kolmogorov–Smirnov and Shapiro–Wilk tests),
variance homogeneity (Levene and Box tests), sphericity (Mauchly’s test) and homogeneity for regression slopes (for
analysis of covariance) were evaluated. When sphericity was violated, Greenhouse Geisser corrections were reported. If
an interaction effect between Group and Emotion was found, then a one-way analysis of variance was conducted to test
the mean difference between groups. A linear regression was further conducted to analyze the effect of FSIQ on total
correct scores. The criteria for sample (15 subjects for predictor), independence (Durbin Watson), multicolinearity and
singularity (Colinearity Statistics), outliers (Cook’s Distance), linearity, independence and homoscedasticity of residuals
were evaluated.
Additionally, for the go/no-go task with letters, a one-way analysis of variance was conducted to determine differences in
correct responses, false positives, omissions and time reactions. Also, an analysis of covariancewas conducted to analyze the
effect of Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) in this task. A linear regressionwas further conducted to see if the FSIQ predicted performance in
these dependent variables.
A mixed analysis of variance was conducted to analyze performance (i.e., correct responses, false positives, omissions and
time reactions) in the emotional go/no-go tasks. Group (three levels: WS subjects, CA and MA controls) was used as the
between-subject factor andEmotion (three levels:happy, angryandscared)as thewithin factor. If an interactioneffect between
Groupand Emotionwas found, then aone-way analysis of variancewas conducted to test themeandifference between groups.
Further, a linear regression was conducted to explore a possible inﬂuence of FSIQ in performance of emotional go/no-go tasks
taken together. A spearman rank correlation was also used to correlate performance obtained in the go/go-no go task with
letters and in emotional go/no-go tasks. A p value less than .05 was assumed to denote a signiﬁcant difference.
3. Results
3.1. Emotion recognition task
Total correct scores (that is, the mean proportion of correct responses) were analyzed using a mixed analysis of variance
with Group as a between-groups factor (three levels: WS, CA and MA) and Emotion as a within-subjects factor (ﬁve levels:
happy, neutral, sad, angry and scared).
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The analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main effect for Group [F(2, 42) = 28.090, p< .001], Emotion [F(3.078, 129.281) = 14.352,
p< .001] and a signiﬁcantGroupbyEmotion interaction [F(6.156, 129.281) = 3.071,p< .01]. Themaineffect for groupoccurred
because the CA and MA groups outperformed SW group (p< .001 for both comparisons), with respect to overall emotion
recognition abilities (that is, the mean proportion of correct responses given to all facial expressions taken together).
Follow-up analyses were conducted with one-way analysis of variance, to explore the signiﬁcant Group by Emotion
interaction.When evaluating performance in relation to each facial expression, therewas a group effect for all emotions but for
angry faces, inwhich no differences between groupswas observed [F(2, 44) = .583, p = .563]. Signiﬁcant group differenceswere
evident in relation to happy faces [F(2, 44) = 4.569, p< .05], withWS group performingworse than chronological age-matched
controls (p< .05, .96 vs. .1, respectively), but at the same level as MA group (p = .067); additionally, no differences were found
between the CA and MA groups (p = .929). When considering sad faces, group differences were observed [F(2, 44) = 6.930,
p< .01], with the WS group performing worse than the CA group (p< .05, .76 vs. .88, respectively) and controls matched for
mental age (p< .01, .76 vs. .90, respectively); again, no differences were found between the CA and MA groups (p = .850). In
relation to scared faces, there was a group effect [F(2, 44) = 14.797, p< .001], with WS group performing worse than
chronological age-matched controls (p< .001, .63 vs. .91, respectively) and controlsmatched formental age (p< .01, .63 vs. .85,
respectively); again, no differences were found between the CA and MA groups (p = .528). Finally, in relation to neutral faces,
there were signiﬁcant differences between groups [F(2, 44) = 6.757, p< .01], with WS group performing worse than
chronological age-matched controls (p< .01, .78 vs. .97, respectively) and controls matched for mental age (p< .01, .78 vs. 94,
respectively) and no differences between typically developing groups were found (p = .832) (see Fig. 2).
Since the participants of this study differ in terms of FSIQ (with subjects with WS having mild to moderate cognitive
impairments), a one-way analysis of covariancewas performed to control the effect of this variable on total correct scores. The
covariate(i.e.,FSIQ)wasnotsigniﬁcantlyrelatedtothisdependentvariable[F(1,41) = .147;p = .704].Additionally,aftercontrolling
for FSIQ, a groupeffect for total correct scores remained (F(2, 41) = 3.296;p< .05). Thisﬁnding is inaccordancewith the fact that
subjectswithWShad aworse performance that individualsmatched formental agewhen considering total correct scores.
When amixed analysis of covariancewas computedwith Group as a between-groups factor (three levels:WS, CA andMA),
Emotion as a within-subjects factor (ﬁve levels: happy, neutral, sad, angry and scared) and FSIQ as a covariate, nomain effects
emerged. Speciﬁcally, main effects for Emotion [F(3.071, 125.898) = .801, p = .498], Group by Emotion interaction [F(3.071,
125.808) = .357,p = .788]andFSIQbyEmotioninteraction[F(6.141,128.898) = .551,p = .773]werenotobserved.Finally,wedidnot
ﬁndamaineffect forFSIQalone [F(1, 41) = .023,p = .880], although itwas foundamaineffect forgroup [F(2, 41) = 4.028,p< .05].
To further explore the relationship between FSIQ and performance in the emotion recognition task, a linear regression
was conductedwith FSIQ as predictor variable and total correct scores as dependent variable. Thismodelwas signiﬁcant [F(1,
43) = 43.060, p< .001], explaining 50% (R2adj ¼ 48:9%) of variance. Accordingly, FSIQ signiﬁcantly predicted correct total
scores (t = 6.562, p< .001), being positively related to this measure (b = .707).
3.2. Error misclassiﬁcations
Table 2 shows the percentages of expressions incorrectly labeled as happy, neutral, sad, angry or scared for each group
when performing the emotion recognition task. Error classiﬁcations indicated that happy faces were the stimuli most easily
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 2. (A) Mean proportion of total correct responses on the emotion recognition task and (B) mean proportion of correct responses on the emotion
recognition task for each expression.
Table 2
Mean percentage (and standard deviation) of misclassiﬁcations for each of the ﬁve emotions on the emotion recognition task.
Happy Fear Neutral Sad Angry
SW 0.05 (0.11) 0.11 (0.09) 0.32 (0.19) 0.18 (0.16) 0.25 (0.21)
CA 0.01 (0.03) 0.06 (0.06) 0.12 (0.14) 0.06 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06)
MA 0.05 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 0.10 (0.12) 0.18 (0.16) 0.11 (0.12)
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identiﬁed in all groups and that individuals with WS had the highest percentage of misclassiﬁcations (with exception for
happy and sad faces, in which displayed a similar proﬁle to the MA group). Also, this group commonly misclassiﬁed
expressions as neutral and angry.
3.3. Social approach task
Fig. 3 showsmean approach ratings for each group on the approach task. Approachability ratings are shown separately for
each emotion (happy, neutral, sad, angry and scared/fearful). Emotion recognition affected performance on the social
approach task, specially for the WS group, with mean approach ratings being more positive for happy expressions and less
positive for negative ones (angry, scared and sad). Also, this group rated neutral faces as medium approachable with the
other typically developing groups showingmore individual variation in their responses, although it is visible that they rated
the happy faces as more approachable than the remaining ones.
Mean approachability ratings were analyzed using a mixed analysis of variance with Group as a between-groups factor
(three levels: WS, CA and MA) and Emotion as a within-subjects factor (ﬁve levels: happy, neutral, sad, angry and scared). It
was found a signiﬁcant main effect for Emotion [F(2.710, 113.805) = 129.5055; p< .001]. However, no Group effect [F(2,
42) = .161, p = .851] nor a Group by Emotion interaction [F(5.419, 113.805) = 1.493; p = .163] were observed.
The social approach results were further re-analyzed using data derived uniquely from those facial expressions, which
were correctly identiﬁed in the emotion recognition task, to see if the approachability ratings were inﬂuenced by the ability
to correctly identify facial expressions. The results obtained were similar, indicating that approachability ratings were not
inﬂuenced by the ability to correctly identify facial expressions. Again, a main effect for Emotion [F(2.732,
114.743) = 116.751; p< .001] was obtained and no Group [F(2, 42) = .149, p = .862] nor for Group by Emotion [F(5.464,
114.743) = 1.377; p = .234] effects were observed.
3.4. Go/no-go tasks
Correct responses (i.e., correct go and no-go trials), false positives (i.e., commission errors), omissions (i.e., not responding
to go stimuli) and reaction times (on go trials) on the go/no-go task with letters1 were analyzed with a one-way analysis of
variance. In this task, groups differed with respect to correct responses [F(2, 43) = 6.653, p< .01] and omissions [F(2,
43) = 6.653, p< .05], but did not differ regarding the number of false positives [F(2, 43) = 2.133, p = .131]. The Scheffe post hoc
test revealed that the CA group outperformed WS group when considering both correct responses (1 vs. .99, respectively,
p< .01) and omissions (0 vs. .13, respectively, p< .1), but performed at the same level as the MA group (p = .491 for both
measures). Also, WS andMA groups had an equivalent performancewhen considering both correct responses and omissions
(p = .066 and p = .491, respectively) (see Fig. 4).
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 3.Mean approachability ratings for each facial stimulus of the ﬁve expressions (12 5).WS = subjectswithWilliams syndrome; CA = chronological age-
matched controls; MA =mental age-matched controls.
1 Only 14 individuals with WS were considered for this analysis.
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To evaluate if FSIQ affected results in this task, an analysis of covariance was performed to control the effect of this
variable in the number of omissions and correct scores. The covariate was not related to the number of omissions [F(1,
40) = .270, p = .606] and, after controlling for FSIQ, no differences between the three groups were observed [F(2, 40) = 1.015,
p = .371]. Similarly, results indicated that the FSIQ was not signiﬁcantly related to total correct scores [F(1, 40) = .270,
p = .606] and, after controlling the effect of this variable, no group effect for corrected scores was found [F(2, 40) = 1.015,
p = .371].
A linear regression analysis was further conducted to explore these relationships, with FSIQ being the predictor variable
and correct responses and omissions the dependent ones. The ﬁrst model (including correct scores as the dependent
variable) was signiﬁcant [F(1, 42) = 11.299, p< .01], explaining 21.2% (R2adj ¼ 19:3%) of variance. Accordingly, the FSIQ
signiﬁcantly predicted correct responses in this task (t = 3.361, p< .01), being positively related to this measure (b = .460).
The second model (with omissions as the dependent variable) was also signiﬁcant [F(1, 42) = 11.299, p< .01], explaining
21.2% (R2adj ¼ 19:3%) of variance. Accordingly, FSIQ signiﬁcantly predicted omissions (t =3.361, p< .01), being, as expected,
negatively related to this measure (b =.460).
When analyzing mean reaction times for the go/no-go task with letters, signiﬁcant differences between groups were
found [F(2, 41) = 4.163, p< .05]. But, surprisingly, the WS group performed equally to both CA (p = .159) and MA group
(p = .729). Differences were found between CA and MA groups: individuals with MAwere slower when performing this task
(p< .05). This ﬁnding is especially relevant, since performance of individuals with WS was not affected by their ﬁne motor
coordination difﬁculties (Gagliardi, Martelli, Burt, & Borgatti, 2007).
Correct responses, false positives, omissions and time reactions in emotional go/no-go tasks2 were analyzed using a
mixed analysis of variance, with Group as a between-groups factor (three levels: WS, CA and MA) and Emotion as a within-
subjects factor (three levels: happy, angry and scared).
In relation to correct responses, no main effects were observed for Group [F(1.310, 52.410) = 4.077; p = .024], Emotion
[F(1.310, 52.410) = 1.192, p = .294], or interaction between Emotion andGroup [F(2.620, 52.410) = 1.200, p = .316] or between
Emotion and FSIQ [F(1.310, 52.410) = 1.199, p = .294]. Accordingly, after controlling for FSIQ, no group effect was found
[F(1.310, 52.410) = 1.199, p = .294] as well as a FSIQ effect, when considered alone [F(1, 40) = 1.511, p = .226].
When analyzing false positives, we did not observed effects of Emotion [F(1.580, 66.346) = 1.028, p = .348], Group [F(2,
42) = .028, p = .972] and Emotion by Group interaction [F(3.159, 66.346) = 1.186, p = .323]. In relation to omissions, we no
effect for Emotion [F(1.007, 42.285) = 1.323, p = .257], Group [F(2, 42) = 1.306, p = .282] and Emotion by Group interaction
[F(2.014, 42.285) = 1.092, p = .345] were found.
[()TD$FIG]
Fig. 4.Mean false positives (FP), omissions (O) and correct responses (C) for non-emotional (with letters) and emotional go/no-go tasks (with happy, scared
and angry faces).
2 In the emotional go/no-go task with angry faces, only 14 participants with WS were considered.
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When analyzing reaction times for the emotional go/no-tasks, amain effect for Emotion [F(1.532, 62.811) = 5.086, p< .05]
was evident, but no signiﬁcant Group [F(1, 41) = .897, p = .416] or Group by Emotion interaction [F(3.064, 62.811) = .539,
p = .661] was observed.
Finally, there was a signiﬁcant correlation between false positive of emotional tasks taken together and those veriﬁed in
the go/no-go task with letters (rsp = .554, p< .001). Correct responses and omissions from both this type of tasks were also
signiﬁcantly correlated (rsp = .427, p< .01 and rsp = .407, p< .01, respectively).
4. Discussion
The aim of this study was to explore emotion recognition abilities, social approach judgments and response inhibition in
individuals with WS, in order to provide a neuropsychological approach concerning the amygdala and prefrontal cortex
neuropsychological hypotheses underlying WS social proﬁle.
In relation to the emotion recognition task, we found that individuals with WS performed worse than chronological and
mental age matched typically individuals when recognizing neutral, scared and sad faces. These data are partially in
accordance with previous studies assessing emotion recognition abilities in individuals with WS (Gagliardi et al., 2003;
Lacroix, Guidetti, Roge´, & Reilly, 2009; Porter et al., 2007; Skwerer et al., 2009; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000), namely
showing that individuals with WS perform worse than chronological age-matched controls in emotion recognition tasks
(Gagliardi et al., 2007; Porter et al., 2007). However, regarding happy facial expressions, we observed that individuals with
WS performed at the same level as individuals matched for mental age. These differences in results may be possibly related
to the utilization of differentmeasures to computemental age. Indeed, Lacroix et al. (2009), using verbalmental age tomatch
a group of individuals with WS and with autism, obtained results similar to those obtained here, namely that individuals
withWS had a worse performance than individuals with autism and controls matched for mental age when recognizing fear
and sadness.
In the approachability task, the performance of the WS group did not differ from both control groups, thus evidencing a
normal rank order of approach. These ﬁndings are in stark contrast with data obtained by Jones et al. (2000) and more
recently byMartens et al. (2009) of abnormal positive ratings in theWS group towards trustworthy and untrustworthy faces.
However, it is important to note that the stimuli used in these studies did not include different facial expressions (instead,
individuals displayed natural expressions), whichmay account for these disparities. Additionally, the results obtained in this
study are inconsistent with those reported by Frigerio et al. (2006), namely, individuals with WS rated happy faces as
signiﬁcantly more approachable than chronological- and mental age-matched controls and the negative faces as
signiﬁcantly less approachable than both control groups. Indeed, we observed that even when individuals with WS are not
able to correctly identify facial expressions, they seem to be able to determine the level of approachability of strangers, which
is in agreementwith the evidence of similar ratings in the approach task inWS and individualsmatched for chronological age
when considering the emotions correctly identiﬁed (Porter et al., 2007).
Regarding the amygdala dysfunction hypothesis, although these results may suggest that individuals with WS present a
speciﬁc impairment in recognizing negative facial expressions, which, in turn, may contribute to their strong urge to make
social interactions, and thus corroborating the amygdala hypothesis (e.g., Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2005;Mun˜oz et al., 2009;
Paul et al., 2009), the results of the present study bring additional information that do not ﬁt within this framework and
deserves further discussion. First, we observed a positive association between FSIQ and performance in the emotion
recognition task, suggesting that intellectual functioning accounts for this ability. Second, individuals with WS did not
differed from both CA and MA groups when recognizing angry facial expressions, indicating that they are actually able to
identify the emotion that more directly signal social threat. Finally, amygdala dysfunction hypothesis does not extend to
approachability ratings presented by individuals with WS, since they do not differ from both typically developing groups. A
possible hypothesis is that individuals with this syndrome are able to distinguish approachable from non-approachable
persons, despite not being able to act in accordance with this social knowledge.
Therefore, in the response inhibition task (go-no go tasks) we observed that individuals with WS did not show
impairment in response inhibition, since comparison of the number of false positives (the primary measure of behavioral
inhibition) for both emotional and non-emotional tasks was similar in the groups under analysis. Also, despite having a
worse performance than individualsmatched for chronological agewhen considering correct responses and omissions in the
go/no-go task with letters, no differences between WS and MA group were found. Further, these disparities disappeared
when the effect of FSIQwas controlled, thus demonstrating that differences in performance could not be directly attributable
to impairment in prefrontal cortex. Still, no differences between groups were found for correct responses and omissions in
emotional go/no-go tasks. Themoderate correlation between false positives of emotional and non-emotional tasks supports
the idea that these tasks provide an identical measure of response inhibition, although towards different cues. So, one could
speculate that individuals with WS have preserved response inhibition abilities, towards both type of stimuli.
Results obtained with the non-emotional go/no-go task contrast with those obtained by Mobbs et al. (2007). These
authors showed a preserved performance of individuals with WS in a go/no-go task with letters in terms of accuracy, but
slowermean time reactions in comparisonwith typically developing subjects. It is important to note that false positiveswere
not directly evaluated in this study, thus limiting comparisons with ﬁndings obtained here. Indeed, the only report assessing
social disinhibition inWS and Down syndrome, was performed by Porter et al. (2007). Despite the task used by these authors
was similar to the go/no-go tasks used here, the stimuli were shapes with happy and sad faces. Performance of individuals
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withWSwas below the level expected on the basis of their level of intellectual functioning; however, no direct comparisons
with typically developing subjects were carried out. Still, this ﬁnding was interpreted as evidence suggesting that the
hypersociability of individuals with WS could be attributable to impairment in the frontal lobe. However, as the authors
themselves acknowledged, a direct link between frontal lobe dysfunction and the abnormal social proﬁle veriﬁed in WS
could not be inferred based on this type of task. Therefore, the present study tried to create a task that would directly
evaluate the relationship between prefrontal (executive) functioning – in particular response inhibition, and indiscriminate
real-world social approach inWS. To achieve this, real-life stimuli of unfamiliar persons were included in all no/no-go tasks.
However, these stimuli and corresponding setting may have not approximated the real-life situations where hypersocial
behaviors ofWSmanifest. Indeed, in contrast to emotion recognition and approachability tasks –which intended to evaluate
awareness, a construct insensible to the setting where it is evaluated, the go/no-go tasks of this study aimed to evaluate
behavior, a more complex construct that is inherently dependent of contextual circumstances. Furthermore, executive
deﬁcits are a characteristic ofWS (Menghini, Addona, Costanzo, & Vicari, 2010) and are more prone to bemanifested in non-
structured environments (Powell & Malia, 2003).
Even though we observed that individuals with WS do not show impairment in response inhibition for both emotional
and non-emotional tasks, these results should not be considered robust enough to exclude the possibility of a prefrontal
involvement inWS social phenotype. Moreover, this evidence highlights the difﬁculty in creating a task that would evaluate
behavior in a rigorous way and simultaneously unravel the anatomical areas known to be responsible of social inhibition,
namely OFC, a region critical for withholding responses in simple go/no-go discrimination tasks (Schoenbaum, Nugent,
Saddoris, & Setlow, 2002).
5. Conclusions
In sum, the current study has shown that individualswithWS present a speciﬁc impairment in recognizing negative facial
expressions. These ﬁndings although consistent with amygdala dysfunction were no longer observed when controlled for
the effect cognitive functioning, suggesting that this ability is strongly related to intellectual abilities. Moreover, we found
that individualswithWS did not differ fromboth CA andMAgroupswhen recognizing angry facial expressions, an important
ﬁnding evidencing that individuals with this syndrome are actually able to identify the emotion more directly signalling
social threat. Regarding the prefrontal contribution to WS hypersocial phenotype, we observed that individuals withWS do
not show impairment in response inhibition for both emotional and non-emotional tasks and thus is inconsistent with this
hypothesis.
The present results do not ﬁt entirely with amygdala and prefrontal hypothesis and most of all, emphasize that rather
than consideringWS hypersociability according to within a lesionmodel, we should consider this proﬁle taking into account
a neurodevelopmental framework and thus, future studies should be carried out in order to assess longitudinal trajectories of
social and emotional development in WS. Indeed, our results indicate that modular brain structures (prefrontal and
amygdala) are not exclusively responsible for fundamental aspects of social behavior in early developmental disorders
(Bauman, Lavenex, Mason, Capitanio, & Amaral, 2004).
Subsequent studies in this domain should also consider the relationship between cognitive/social representations and
behavior in individuals with WS, since they do not seem to make use of their knowledge about social interactions. Indeed,
despite having perceptions of approachability that not differ from those displayed by typically developing subjects (as
evidenced in the present study), these individuals do not seem to act accordingly to this awareness. An explanation for this
phenomenon can be interpreted in light of the ‘‘somatic marker hypothesis’’ of Damasio (1994). This hypothesis posits that
when humans experience a speciﬁc emotion, the brain records this state in cell patterns from neural and hormonal feedback,
and this information is subsequently used to guide behavior appropriately (e.g., indicatingwhether to approach orwithdraw
from a situation based on predictions about rewarding/punishing consequences). So, one hypothesis could be that
individuals with WS do not experience the bodily sensations (i.e., somatic markers) associated with negative emotions,
which causes inappropriate behaviors in social interactions (Damasio, 1999). Also, this hypothesis may account for their
apparent insensitiveness in relation to punishing experiences, since they continue be attracted by social stimuli despite
experience difﬁculties in this realm. These predictions are actually in accordance with recent ﬁndings showing that
individuals with WS are less electrodermally responsive and show more heart deceleration than controls when presented
with facial stimuli (Doherty-Sneddon, Riby, Calderwood, & Ainsworth, 2009; Skwerer et al., 2009). Further studies,
employing physiological measures (e.g., skin conductance analysis) during emotion recognition/approachability/go/no-go
tasks, should be conducted to test this somatic marker hypothesis in individuals with WS.
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